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INTRODUCTION: COVID, CONTRACT,
AND CRISES
JONATHAN C. LIPSON & RACHEL REBOUCHÉ∗
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 (“COVID”)1 pandemic disrupted most social and legal
institutions, and contract was no exception. Sometimes, the disruptions were
localized and personal: venue-rental contracts were not honored because
weddings or birthday parties were cancelled or delayed. Other times, the
disruptions were national or international in scope: mergers and acquisitions
were deferred or abandoned; the orders that feed global supply chains for
clothing and other consumer goods became unpredictable. These disruptions
were an occasion to consider foundational questions about contract law and what,
concretely, should the legal system do in a world where “COVID rendered many
contracts in or near breach,” as one of us recently observed.2
The COVID pandemic meant, among other things, that parties would need
to make the choice whether to renegotiate or litigate their contracts. Any choice
would be made especially difficult given the uncertain trajectory of the pandemic:
while we might not come “roaring back,” the economy could certainly rebound,
as it did after the pandemic of 1918-19. To litigate or to go into bankruptcy would
be to terminate or impair relationships, which may be problematic during and
after the pandemic. But reconfiguring contractual arrangements (or simply doing
nothing) was also a fraught choice, especially in an environment where
governments’ responses to both the public-health and economic challenges of
COVID became heavily politicized. Contract parties could neither ignore their
agreements nor expect that ordinary public responses—whether through judicial
intercession or fiscal largesse—were likely to be reliable or effective. This left a
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(Standstills), 76 BUS. LAW. 437, 440 (2021).
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large, if new and uncertain, role for private ordering through contract.
COVID was also an invitation to consider whether leading theoretical
frameworks—utilitarian or deontological, for instance—will continue to pack the
same analytic punch. The global pandemic challenged the dominant conception
of contract law and theory as a microeconomic puzzle, sealed off from larger
social and political (and public-health) concerns. At the same time, assessing
promissory duty in this setting without delimiting a proper role for economic gain
and loss seems dangerously naïve. COVID will not lead us to solve these core
questions about contract jurisprudence, but the pandemic destabilized both the
institution of contract and the ways that we think about it.
There are thus larger lessons to learn here than just those pertaining to
COVID. Contract is, among other things, a mechanism to shape and articulate
expectations, and to define and distribute losses when those expectations are
disappointed. A pandemic presents profound challenges to, and opportunities
for, contract because contract law will always seek to anticipate and achieve those
goals, even as it will always be an imperfect means for doing so.
In the early days of the pandemic, unsure of almost everything about it, a
group of us created a remote monthly workshop to discuss our early and
developing thoughts on the problems that COVID created for contract. We
called the workshop “K-COVID,” after the convention among U.S. legal
academics to abbreviate “contract” with the letter K. There, authors presented
early versions of much of the work that appears in this symposium Issue of Law
and Contemporary Problems, “Contract in Crisis.”
This Issue reflects and expands on the K-COVID workshop in order to better
understand the reciprocal interactions of contract and COVID, and what those
interactions might tell us about future crises. As one might expect, the group
comes to no single, clear consensus on the underlying questions (or their
answers). Those questions include:
1. Do existing doctrine and theory provide adequate guidance to reallocate
losses in light of the pandemic?
2. To what extent do the relationships of the parties—that is, relational
contracting—supplement or supplant contract doctrine in this sort of
crisis?
3. How does contract affect underlying, preexisting social inequities
exacerbated by the pandemic?
4. Does the pandemic invite or induce innovative ways to think about
contract which might provide greater resilience to economic and
contractual relationships in the next crisis?
To understand each other’s thinking on these themes, we conducted a twoday workshop in July 2021. Rather than undertaking the traditional format of
twenty-minute presentations, followed by questions and discussion, we asked
contributors to limit their presentations to five minutes of key points (an
“elevator pitch”), after which an invited commentator provided brief reflections.
The result was a dynamic and fast-paced exchange that distilled each contribution
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to its core themes.
As we describe the contributions of this volume’s authors below, we are
reminded of our gratitude to the commentators who participated in the July
workshop.3 Several of them have published their comments in this collection.4 To
provide a roadmap for the essays and commentaries that follow, we organize this
Introduction according to the authors’ responses to the following themes that
weave through so many of this symposium’s contributions.
1.

Doctrinal & Theoretical Challenges Presented by COVID

In Retrospective Risk Allocation, Professor Aditi Bagchi opens
(alphabetically and analytically) by focusing on two questions that the recent
pandemic makes especially salient. First, “should courts consider some facts
unavailable to parties at the time of contract but which plausibly would have
altered their contract design?”5 Second, “[s]hould courts consider public policy
pursued by regulators during or after an unforeseen contingency like the
pandemic?”6
Drawing on her expertise in contract interpretation, Bagchi argues that the
answer to the first should be “yes” and the second “maybe,” but “only
sparingly.”7 While courts should obviously enforce pandemic-induced regulation
and legislation, in gaps, “courts should be more attentive to public policy
predating the crisis” because, she argues, “[i]t is more appropriate for courts to
flexibly decipher regulatory norms drafted without specific knowledge of the
relevant contingency because regulators could not have enacted rules more
clearly on point.”8
Several contributors were concerned about the capacity of contract law to
provide guidance under these conditions of a global pandemic. Professor Robert
Hillman, for example, argues in Health Crises and the Limited Role of Contract
Law, that “current contract law’s many and varied, sometimes even
contradictory, rules and principles relevant to shaping a response to a health crisis
3. The commentators were Susan Block-Lieb, Fordham University School of Law; Miriam Cherry,
Saint Louis University School of Law; Christine Hurt, Brigham Young University School of Law; Cathy
Hwang, University of Virginia School of Law; Larry Garvin, Ohio State University Moritz College of
Law; Juliet Kostritsky, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Jennifer Lee, Temple
University-Beasley School of Law; Kish Parella, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Rachel
Rebouché, Temple University School of Law; Jeremy Telman, Oklahoma City University School of law;
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
4. See Susan Block-Lieb, A Comment on Foohey et al., Steering Loan Modifications PostPandemic, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 225; Larry T. Garvin, A Comment on Snyder,
Contracting for Process, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 277; David A. Hoffman, A
Comment on Hillman, Health Crises, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 33; Cathy Hwang, A
Comment on Casey & Niblett, The Limits of Public Contract Law, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2,
2022, at 73; Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Comment on Colla and Gulati, Cheeky Contracting, 85 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 127.
5. Aditi Bagchi, Retrospective Risk Allocation, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022 at 1, 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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can offer only limited guidance to courts and lawyers in challenging cases.”9
Indeed, Hillman suggests that “there may be no better example of the limits of
contract law, as administered by courts, than its response to contract disputes
during a public health crisis.”10 Professor David Hoffman, in his commentary,
identifies “three original analytical contributions” of Professor Hillman’s essay,
including, “how courts weighing diffuse public health interests might conflict with
contractual arrangements.”11
Consistent with this, Professor Brian Bix observes a degree of caution among
courts asked to exercise equitable powers under changed circumstances
doctrines, such as impossibility and frustration of purpose.12 In COVID Concerns:
Some Realism About Equitable Relief, Professor Bix contrasts contemporary
court decisions with prior crises (in particular, the closing of the Suez Canal in
1956-57). He finds that, given the need for predictability in commercial relations,
“[w]here equitable doctrines like frustration of purpose and impracticability
might seem, by their terms, to apply to a broad range of cases, it is not surprising
that the courts will find ways to read them narrowly, such that relief is in fact
granted in only a small fraction of the cases litigated.”13
Professors Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett extend this point, to argue
that courts are simply not designed to address the kinds of problems presented
by pandemics in The Limits of Public Contract Law.14 “The judicial
administration of contract law is a particularly ill-suited tool for addressing
systemic problems,” they argue, because “[c]ompared to other legal institutions,
a court deciding a contract dispute is at a disadvantage in developing and
implementing public policy.”15 Professor Cathy Hwang’s comment on this piece
highlights areas of disagreement with Professors Casey and Niblett’s thesis,
introducing, for example, the “benefits of randomness,” especially in response to
a pandemic: that is, incentivizing parties to consider cancelling an event and
negotiating solutions outside of court.16
Professor Jeff Lipshaw widens the lens further in Between Rights and Rites:
The Ironies of Crisis and Contract, using COVID as an occasion to question the
efficacy of rights in general, a point sharpened by the conflicting demands and

9. Robert A. Hillman, Health Crises and the Limited Role of Contract Law, 85 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 19.
10. Id.
11. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 35.
12. Brian H. Bix, COVID Concerns: Some Realism About Equitable Relief, 85 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 37.
13. Id. at 49.
14. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Limits of Public Contract Law, 85 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 51.
15. Id. at 52. In part, Casey and Niblett are challenging an argument for judicial reformation of
contracts in light of COVID advanced in David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract,
121 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (2021). Hwang responds to Casey and Niblett in this symposium, see Hwang,
supra note 4, at 73.
16. Hwang, supra note 4, at 75.
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commands of the pandemic.17 “A world wholly governed by rights”—including
contract rights—would, Lipshaw argues, “be like a machine whose metal parts
grind on other metal parts, with no metaphoric grease supplied by things like
trust,deference, or discretion.”18 While rights may matter, so too must “oughts,”
norms which may take on heightened salience during a crisis. Rights, Lipshaw
argues, risk becoming “rites,” “fraught with fundamentalism, apostasy, and
heresy.”19
2.

How the Relationships of the Parties or Relational Contracting Supplement
or Supplant Contract Doctrine

Professor Lipshaw is not the only law-skeptic in the group. The richest vein
of skepticism in contract scholarship comes from relationalists, who question the
primacy of “law” in private (or any social) order. Several authors start from the
point thus developed: law has limited reach in a pandemic, especially private law.
What else is there? Norms of trust and reciprocity endemic to ongoing
relationships.
Professors Paolo Colla and Mitu Gulati see the pandemic as a natural
experiment to study the tension between law and social norms embedded in
ongoing relationships by studying sovereign bond price movements.20 In The
Price of Cheeky Contracting, they present the results of an empirical study of socalled “collective action clauses” in sovereign bonds, in particular those issued by
the “perennial ‘bad boy’ of the international debt markets: the Republic of
Argentina.”21 Although the details are complex, their findings are consistent with
a market penalty for what they call “cheeky contracting,” a form of opportunistic
behavior unconstrained by common relational norms. Commenting on
Professors Colla and Gulati’s essay, Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan asks “how
cheeky is cheeky?” and observes that one “can be sincere and reasonable yet still
self-serving.”22
Professor Heminway takes aim at a recent Harvard Business Review article
by Frydlinger et al., An Innovative Way to Prevent Adversarial Supplier
Relationships, which promotes the use of “formal relational contracts” as a means
of reducing contractual opportunism, including during cataclysmic events such as
COVID.23 Heminway finds much to admire in the article’s emphasis on
17. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Between Rights and Rites: The Ironies of Crisis and Contract, 85 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 77.
18. Id. at 78.
19. Id.
20. Paolo Colla & Mitu Gulati, The Price of Cheeky Contracting, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
2, 2022, at 99.
21. Id. at 102.
22. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 4, at 127, 129.
23. Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Potential Legal Value of Relational Contracts in a Time of Crisis
or Uncertainty, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 131 (citing David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart &
Kate Vitasek, An Innovative Way to Prevent Adversarial Supplier Relationships, HARV. BUS. REV., (Oct.
8, 2020) https://hbr.org/2020/10/an-innovative-way-to-prevent-adversarial-supplierrelationships?ab=hero-subleft-3) [https://perma.cc/5VFV-GQZG].
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delineating and sharing risks and benefits under long term contracts, especially
supply-chain agreements, which have come to play an especially important role
in the pandemic. But she worries that the business-oriented readers of this
otherwise influential review may not appreciate the subtle uncertainties of U.S.
contract law, including those noted above. Heminway usefully points out, for
example, that aspirationally cooperative terms, such as “[w]e will make decisions
based on a balanced assessment of needs, risks, and resources” may not in fact be
legally enforceable.24
Professor Sarah Dadush takes up the issue of global supply chains as well,
offering a searing account of the carelessness and selfishness with which buyers
have dealt with their suppliers in the apparel sector during, as well as before, the
pandemic.25 Given how bad the “real deal” is for garment manufacturers in the
apparel supply chain, relational contract theorists could have predicted that the
pandemic would generate a wave of contract “abandonments” by buyers.
However, relational contract theory might not offer a means for improving the
fairness of those arrangements. Dadush argues that when the potential social
costs of poor commercial behavior are potentially high—for workers’ human
rights, health, and safety, for example—parties have a shared responsibility to
adopt what she calls a prosocial approach to contracting.
3.

How Contract Affects Underlying, Preexisting Social Inequities
Exacerbated by the Pandemic

In addition to considering how relational contracting norms and techniques,
such as those considered by Professor Dadush’s discussion of supply-chain
agreements, could be invoked and expanded to address the mistreatment of third
parties to contracts, other contributors explored the role that contract played in
exacerbating social injustices that predated the pandemic.
Professor Mechele Dickerson, for example, documents in Protecting the
Pandemic Essential Worker that front-line (face-to-face) pandemic workers were
disproportionately people of color, receiving relatively meager wages in
dangerous conditions. Although called “essential,” Dickerson observes, “these
workers were treated like they were expendable.”26 Dickerson describes the role
that contract (in particular, at-will employment agreements) played in creating
this state of affairs, and proposes that state and/or federal governments develop
default rules that would provide baseline protections for such workers in the next
pandemic. She also proposes that businesses that profited significantly during the
pandemic, who relied on essential workers, pay an excess profits tax.
Professors Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, and Christopher Odinet focus on
modifications of auto loans, credit cards, unsecured personal loans, and other
24. Id. at 143 (quoting Frydlinger, et al.).
25. Sarah Dadush, Prosocial Contracts: Making Relational Contracts More Relational, 85 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 153.
26. Mechele Dickerson, Protecting the Pandemic Essential Worker, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 2, 2022, at 177, 178.
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installment or revolving loans.27 Some lenders may “use people’s desperation
and lack of specific knowledge to place borrowers in unaffordable loan
modifications” or “hastily offer a modification that does not consider the
borrower’s ability to successfully repay the modified loan.”28 They argue that the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should “issue a compliance
bulletin which directs loan servicers to make a reasonable determination whether
a borrower has the ability to make all required, scheduled payments in
connection with any loan modification.”29 Such a regulatory intervention would
help sort consumers whose loans can successfully be modified from those who do
not qualify for loan modifications, and thus for whom bankruptcy may be the best
option. In her commentary, Professor Susan Block-Lieb asks whether the
authors’ proposed reform should occur through consumer-protection regulation
and questions why an ability-to-repay regulatory format should be preferred.30
Professor Martha Ertman connects racial inequity and debt in Reparations for
Racial Wealth Disparities as Remedy for Social Contract Breach, arguing that the
“racial allocation of resources breaches the social contract that political theory
teaches provides a foundation for law.”31 After summarizing “the outrageous
racial disparities in the impact of COVID-19, as well as broader wealth
disparities,” she identifies various ways in which debt contracting has created and
exacerbated racial disparities.32 She proposes a variety of forms of reparations,
based in principles of unjust enrichment and restitution.
4.

Innovative Ways to Think About Contract Which Might Provide Greater
Resilience in the Next Crisis

All contributors offered various views about innovation in contract in
anticipation of future crises. Some, of course, are skeptical of the virtues of or
need for innovation. Others, however, explicitly embraced the pandemic as a
moment to offer different ways to think about contract.
Professor David Snyder, for example, uses the occasion of the pandemic to
identify and describe what he calls “contracting for process.”33 Contracting for
process is, Snyder argues, the “steps to be taken even though those steps are not
the primary object of the contract.”34 It is distinct, he argues, from contracting for
outcomes. Examples include contracts that protect supply chain resilience
through processes such as monitoring, updating, learning, and adjusting;
modifying production location; and verifying redundancy, excess capacity, and
27. Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, Steering Loan Modifications PostPandemic, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 201.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 205.
30. Block-Lieb, supra note 4, at 225.
31. Martha M. Ertman, Reparations for Racial Wealth Disparities as Remedy for Social Contract
Breach, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 231, 232.
32. Id. at 233.
33. David V. Snyder, Contracting for Process, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 255.
34. Id. at 255.
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multiple sourcing. Snyder argues that “[c]ontracting for process can help resolve
the tension between the reliability that a contract can provide and the flexibility
that may be needed in disrupted times.”35 Professor Larry Garvin, in his
commentary, agrees that law should “take account of context and flexibility,” and
notes the additional attention that the roles of lawyers, institutions, and norms in
inspiring trust could receive.36
Professor Matthew Jennejohn connects literatures on relational contracting
and the social science of economic shock diffusion to offer an innovative way to
understand the networks of contracts involved in the production of complex
goods such as pharmaceuticals.37 He starts from the observation that profound
changes in contract design and implementation have placed a premium on
assuring market resilience. While there are various policy prescriptions for
achieving this goal, “[o]ne of the challenges of calibrating prescriptions for
improving market resilience is accurately diagnosing market fragility.”38
Jennejohn recommends that any policy response to the “wickedly complicated”
problem of market contagion requires us to recognize a “diversity of diffusion
patterns that may be difficult to anticipate. Market fragility is not uniform across
the economy, and so any policy response must be contingent and flexible.”39
Given that complexity, “improving contract design might be a useful ex ante
prophylactic measure that promotes resilience in environments where ex post
regulatory intervention may struggle to gain purchase.”40
CONCLUSION
The contributions to this symposium are, at one level, all efforts to improve
the design of contracts and the institutions supporting and implementing private
ordering, perhaps making contract law and practice more resilient given what we
have learned in the COVID pandemic. Some sort of “normal” is clearly possible
in the wake of COVID, yet that normal will differ in ways profound and subtle
from pre-pandemic times. Although changes in contracting are but a small piece
of this larger set of changes, the contributions to Contract in Crisis offer
important insights into future trajectories for contract theory, doctrine, and
policy as we move forward.

35. Id. at 257.
36. Garvin, supra note 4, at 277.
37. Matthew Jennejohn, The Transactional Dynamics of Market Fragility, 85 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 281.
38. Id. at 282.
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. at 284.

